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CONSUELO BOKUM*

Implementing the Public Welfare
Requirement in New Mexico's Water
Code
"State water management cannot effectively address and
incorporate public interest values unless state statutory and
regulatory provisions related to water management recognize
the values and establish means for responding to them. It is
critical that each state assess the adequacy of its existing legal
framework and institutions in this regard."
ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that the New Mexico legislature added a public
welfare criterion to the water code over 10 years ago, the State
EngineerOffice has not addressed the applicationof the criterionby
regulation and has only addressed public welfare briefly in a few
decisions. There is almost no case law in New Mexico addressing
this issue. More and more participants,however, are raising public
welfare in water rights protests. This paperaddresses how the public
welfare criterionhas developed in western water law and proposes an
approachfor use of the criterion in New Mexico.
I. INTRODUCTION
When New Mexico's water code was enacted in 1907, the state
was sparsely populated,2 and people relied mainly on surface water

* Ms. Bokum is the Water Project Director for the New Mexico Environmental Law
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1. Symposium, Western Governors' Association, Western WaterManagement in an Era of
Change: IncorporatingPublic Interest, Report of the Oct. 10-12, Park City Workshop 5 (1991)

(draft on file with the Western Governors' Association and the Western States Water Council).
2. In 1910, the population of New Mexico was 327,301. Census Bureau, Thirteenth

Census of the United States, taken in the year 1910, with supplement for the state of New
Mexico, 1910.
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supplies. The Territorial Engineer was required to make four findings in
allocating the state's waters: that there was unappropriated water; that
the water would be put to beneficial use; that other users' water rights
would not be impaired by the new user; and that the use was not
contrary to the public interest.3 Even 85 years ago, the legislature
considered the public interest to be fundamental to the management of
the state's water. When the Supreme Court of the Territory of New
Mexico interpreted public interest, it did not limit its interpretation to
beneficial or economic uses, but held that public interest must be
construed broadly.'
The requirements in the water code reflected the economic and
social values of the times. Conditions have changed since then. The state's
population has increased approximately five times to over one and a half
million.' Surface waters have become overappropriated, and water users
have become increasingly dependent on ground water and water from
projects. Ground water is now being used in many areas of the state
faster than it is being replenished, and new supplies from water projects
such as dams have become either too costly or, unfeasible. Interstate
stream compacts and Indian water rights impose additional constraints
on water use.
Because New Mexico's surface water supplies are generally
appropriated, market forces are driving water'transfers and, to an
increasing extent, the management and allocation of water.6 Water rights
are moving to those who are willing and able to pay the highest price.
Although the ability to pay is a measure of the economic benefit to be
derived from the new use, it does not take into account either third party
impacts or other, non-economic values that reflect the public welfare. The
rural poor, minorities, and environmental and aesthetic concerns are not

3. 1907 N.M Laws, ch. 49, § 28.

4. Prior to 1985, New Mexico statutory law enabled the State Engineer to refuse to
approve an application for an appropriation of water if, in his opinion, it would be "contrary
to the public interest." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7 (Michie 1978). The only New Mexico case
that interpreted this section was Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
5. In 1990, the population was 1,515,069. BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, UNIvERSrIY OF NEW MEXIco, THE CENSUS IN NEw MExico. POPULATION AND
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE STATE AND COUNTIES FROM 1980 AND 1990 CENSUSES

(1992).
6. This is true even for many ground water appropriations. Pumping a well near a
stream system will create a cone of depression that will draw water from the surface into
the ground. Because New Mexico must keep its stream systems whole to avoid impairment
to existing users and to meet interstate stream obligations, those drilling a new well must
obtain surface water rights to offset the well's impact on a stream. City of Albuquerque v.
Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (N.M. 1962).
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equitably represented in the market place." Nor does the market
necessarily protect against shifting the external costs of water use to the
public.8
Attitudes toward water use are changing as well. Many New
Mexicans now give greater importance to social and environmental
values related to water use, such as water quality, ecological protection,
and preservation of cultures and traditional communities.9
In 1985, the New Mexico legislature amended several statutes in
the water code to mandate that the State Engineer consider whether
applications for water rights are detrimental to the public welfare. 10
These amendments were made largely in response to litigation with
Texas"', and for a number of years they remained dormant, infrequently
invoked in consideration of applications for either appropriations or
transfers of water. More recently, new concerns'about the impacts of
water use at the local level have prompted an increasing number of
protests of applications on public welfare grounds.
Consideration of public welfare raises economic, environmental
and social issues. Often these new values cannot be measured or
compared to one another easily. Many of these concerns have never
before existed in the domain of the State Engineer Office. The public
welfare criterion significantly expands the State Engineer's role in

7. See David H. Getches, Water Planning: Untapped Opportunity for the Western States,
9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 4-8 (1988).
8. For example, if a water user contaminates water, both downstream users and the
general public may bear the consequences and costs of that contamination.
9. Ensuring that public welfare values are recognized ana protected in New Mexico
is important for reasons not found in other western states: "All water management activities,
from permit applications to adjudications, are more suspect than they are in other states
because they threaten the complex and fragile web of communal uses [acequias or
communal ditch systems) or threaten to deprive Indians or Hispanics of control over their
future." COMMIrrEE OF WESrERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WATER TRANSFERS INTHE WEST: EFFIcENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 163 (1992).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-5.1, 72-5-6, 72-5-7, 72-5-23, 72-12-3, 72-12-7 (Michie Repl.
Pamp. 1985). The amendments also require that applications not be "contrary to conservation in the state." See discussion, infra, Section Ill. A. 2. for a discussion on the adoption of
these amendments. The phrase "public interest" appeared in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-7 until
1985 when "welfare" was substituted for "interest." The terms "'public welfare" and "public
interest" are used throughout western states' water codes. The terms appear to be
synonymous, "Public welfare" is used in this paper because that is the term that appears in
the New Mexico water code and includes public interest when used in reference to other
western states unless referring to the phrase used in a specific statute or document.
11. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M..1983). The ruling in City of
El Paso relied on Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), a US. Supreme
Court case that utilized the phrase "public welfare."
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managing the state's water resources and presents a new and difficult
challenge for

-

and burden on

-

the State Engineer. 12

While there may be problems associated with the implementation
of the public welfare criterion, the public welfare requirement establishes
a mechanism to broaden water resources protection. It provides the basis
for the state to choose among competing uses and for denying or
conditioning those applications that will have significant negative
impacts. The authority given to the State Engineer to protect the "public
welfare" enables the state to grapple with the problems and concerns of
the twenty-first century, including the limitations imposed by scarce
water resources.
When the water code was amended in 1985, the New Mexico
legislature did not define public welfare. There has been some debate
about the scope of public welfare and the manner in which public welfare
should be applied. 13 Given the increasing frequency in which public
welfare is invoked in water rights applications, clarifying how this
criterion will be applied becomes increasingly important. This article:
1) begins with a review of the public trust doctrine which both
provides the basis for the management of water as an essential public
resource and encompasses public welfare values;
2) summarizes the benefits and problems with several of the
approaches suggested for the application of the public welfare criterion;
3) argues that the term should be defined broadly under the
State Engineer's rulemaking authority; 4 and

12. Indeed, public welfare presents a challenge to all western states. In 1991 and 1992,
the Western Governors' Association and the Western States Water Council held two
workshops to "enhance the West's capacity to deal with an increasingly complex world of
water." The results of the workshops have become known as the Park City Principles. 'The
Principles recognize the daunting challenges for resource managers who must act on the
basis of incomplete information, subject to public scrutiny, while faced with conflicting
demands for limited water supplies." CRAIG BELL ET. AL., RETOOLING WESTERN WATER
MANAGEMENT: THE PARK CITY PRINCIPLES 15 (unpublished draft manuscript on file with the
Western Governors' Association and the Western States Water Council). The second of three
meetings focused on public interest in water management decisions.
13. In November, 1993, a State Engineer Task Force was convened to review and make
recommendations on several water rights policies, including the public welfare criterion in
the water code. The Task Force's report summarized a range of alternatives for utilizing the
public welfare criterion which included retaining the current policy or issuing an allinclusive regulation. Memorandum from the State Engineer Task Force on the Task Force's
Discussion on Policy of the State Engineer in the Albuquerque Region to Eliud Martinez,
State Engineer (Mar. 8, 1994) (on file with the State Engineer's office) [hereinafter State
Engineer Task Force).
14. State Engineer Eluid Martinez announced that he would hold a rulemaking on
public welfare at a legislative meeting in December, 1994. He took no action, however,
before he was asked to resign by Governor Gary Johnson in early 1995.
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4) includes a draft of a public welfare definition as well as standards for its implementation.
IL THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a concept deeply imbedded nationally
in judicial decisions related to public resources, and the constraints and
duties it places on water management and allocation should be recognized in seeking to follow New Mexico's legislative mandate to protect
the public welfare.
The public trust doctrine originated in Roman and English
common law. The doctrine is based on the principle that water, like other
basic resources, is so essential that it must be held by the state in an
inalienable trust for common use. The state has a duty to maintain and
preserve these resources for the public 5 and enforces the public trust as
the representative of the public.16 Significantly, the public trust doctrine
has most often been applied to water. 7
The principles underlying the doctrine are evident in the West
where water is considered to be a public resource,'8 states control the
allocation of water, and water rights are usufructuary only, that is, water
rights holders do not own the water, but only have the right to use it as
long as they comply with all the statutory provisions.
A. General Public Trust PrinciplesEstablished by the Courts
In what is considered the "primary authority even today 19' for
public trust doctrine cases, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 ruled in
Illinois CentralRailroad Co. v. Illinois" that governments may not alienate
public resources, in this case the shoreline in Chicago.
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, than it can abdicate its
police powers in the administration of government and the

15. Historically, the public trust doctrine extended to tidelines and the beds beneath
water. Don Negaard, The Public Trust Doctrine in North Dakota, 54 N. D. L. REV. 565, 569
(1977-78); see also Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal.1983).
16. Frank J. Trelease,Government OwnershipandTrusteeshipof Water,45 CAL. L.REV. 638,
640 (1957).
17. Negaard, supra note 15, at 569.
18. In many of the western states, either state constitutions or statutes declare that the
water of the state belongs to the people or that water must be used in the public welfare.
See discussion, infra, Sec. IV.
19. City of Berkeley v. Sup. Ct., 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980).
20. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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preservation of peace. In the administration of government,
the use of such powers may for a limited period be delegated
to a municipality or other body, but there always remains with
the State the right to revoke those powers and exercise them
in a more direct manner, and one more conformable to its
wishes. So with trusts connected with public property, or
property of a special character, they cannot be placed entirely
beyond the direction and control of the State.3r
Property held in the public trust cannot be disposed of if doing
so results in a substantial impairment of the public interest in that resource.2
Certain principles have emerged as state courts around the
country have articulated and developed the public trust doctrine. Three
states with a developed and expansive body of law on this issue are
Wisconsin, Massachusetts and California.' The judicial rulings in these
three states, as well as those states in the West that have applied the
doctrine to water, include principles that may be adopted by other states'
courts as they are challenged to articulate a public trust doctrine.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that the state
holds public resources "in its capacity as trustee for the benefit of all the
people, " 4 and that these resources must be regulated to accomplish and
promote public interests.' The trust responsibility is not passive; a
resource subject to trust responsibilities must not only be preserved, but
also promoted.' Decisions regarding the use and disposition of public
resources may not be delegated to groups or interests that are narrowly
based' nor may public interest considerations be narrowly construed.'
Limited or private interests may not prevail over broader or public
interests," and the state has no authority to grant public resources to
private persons for private gain.' The state may exercise its powers over

21. Id. at 453-54.
22. Id.
23. Wisconsin and Massachusetts cases are discussed in this section. California cases
are discussed in Sec. II B. Not all states have developed the doctrine judicially or
legislatively.
24. In re Trempealeau Drainage District, 131 N.W. 838, 840 (Wis. 1911).
25. Id. at 841.
26. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830-31 (Wis. 1927).
27. See City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1959); Muench v. Public
Service Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), ajfd on reh'g, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952).
28. Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 522, citing Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 815,820
(Wis. 1914).
29. Muench, 53 N.W.2d at 522.
30. Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67 N.W. 918 (Wis. 1896); In
re Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist. No. 1,1% N.W. 874 (Wis. 1924), cert. denied, 264
U.S. 598 (1924); City of Milwaukee, 214 N.W. at 820; Trempealeau, 131 N.W. at 838.
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a public resource only where there is no substantial impairment to the
public interest.31
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has limited public agencies'
control over public resources even where those agencies' statutory
authority is broad and general. The court held that public resources
cannot be converted from one public use to "another inconsistent public
use without plain and explicit legislation" to that end.3 2 The court was
especially concerned about the diversion of public land for private,
commercial use and required that statutes delegating control over land
to a commission be strictly interpreted.' Furthermore, the court prohibited granting authority to another public entity when a commission
divested itself of its statutory functions.' In all of these cases, the court
limited public agency discretion in diverting public resources (park land,
a pond and wetlands) from one use to another. Authority for such
changes must come specifically from the legislature, a body directly
responsible to the public and not from administrative agencies which are
one step removed from public scrutiny.
A number of principles emerge from judicial decisions in these
and other states. First, whenever the public trust is involved in decisionmaking, it is the duty of the state agency to protect the broad interests of
the public. Second, private, limited and immediate interests must not
dictate or prevail over public, broad, and, long-term statewide interests.
Broadly based public interests must be protected from the undue
influence exercised by self-interested and powerful minorities.35
B. The Public Trust Doctrine as Applied to Water Resources
in the West
The constitutions and statutes of many western states,' including New Mexico,' 7 codify a basic tenet of the public trust doctrine:
Water resources belong to the public. The public trust doctrine, however,
does not appear explicitly in the New Mexico water code or in the water

31. State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957).
32. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm., 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Mass. 1966); see also
Sacco v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 227 N.E.2d 478, 479 (Mass. 1967); Robbins v. Dep't of Pub.
Works, 244 N.E. 2d 577, 579 (Mass. 1968).
33. Gould, 215 N.E.2d at 122.
34. Id. at 124.
35. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust In Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471,560 (1969-70). This law review article is one of the chief reviews of the
public trust doctrine and is cited in judicial decisions, including Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.

Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983).
36. See discussion, infra, Sec. W.
37. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, §2.
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codes of any other western state. As discussed in this section, several
state courts in the West have recognized - or imposed - the public
trust doctrine on management of water.
California's extensive case law relates the public trust doctrine to
water management. Even before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Illinois
Central Railroad,' the California Supreme Court ruled that the legislature
may not give away the rights of the people to navigable waters."
Although parties may acquire rights in trust properties, those rights
remain subject to the trust and no vested rights may be asserted that are
harmful to the trust.40 When acting under its trust responsibilities, the
state's power to control and regulate a natural resource is absolute,4
and the state is obligated to exercise continuing jurisdiction to prevent a
"harmful" use of the resource.' California courts have also stressed that
actions taken by local bodies must be scrutinized closely to protect the
general statewide interest in public resources.' In 1971, the California
Supreme Court expanded the public trust doctrine to include recreation,
the environment and ecology as public trust values related to water
resources."
In 1983, in the most far-reaching case related to the public trust
doctrine and water management, the California Supreme Court decided
the "Mono Lake" case 0 and ruled that the "core of the public trust
doctrine is the state's authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous
supervision and control over" the waters of the state." Consequently, the
"public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system are parts
of an integrated system of water law."47 Even where a party claims a
vested right to divert water, that right is barred when it becomes clear
that the diversion harms interests protected by the public trust.' Thus,
the public trust doctrine may be applied retroactively.
When the state agency managing water failed to include public
trust in its deliberations, the court emphatically acted to ensure that the
public trust doctrine was considered. Where water had been appropriated
without consideration of the public trust doctrine, public trust interests

38. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
39. People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 4 P. 1150, 1159 (Cal. 1884).
40. See, e.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 273 P. 797,815 (Cal. 1928); City of Berkeley v. Sup. Ct.,
606 P.2d 362,369 (Cal. 1980).
41. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
42. People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 196 Cal. Rptr. 7,8 (Ct. App. 1983).
43. Sax, supra note 35, at 538-44.
44. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380.
45. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
46. Id. at 712.
47. Id. at 732.
48. Id. at 712, 721, 727.
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may be harmed," and agencies must avoid or minimize harm to public
trust values when feasible.' The state has an affirmative duty to take
into account and protect the public trust whenever feasible when
planning or allocating water resources. 51 Agencies must also take into
account that public trust values should encompass changing public
needs.' The failure of an agency to weigh and consider public trust uses
imposes a greater duty on a court to reconsider a state water agency
decision.'
Idaho's Supreme Court ruled in a leading case that Idaho's public
interest requirement is "related to the larger doctrine of the public
trust."5' Citing an earlier case,5 ' the court noted that water is held in
trust for the benefit of the public and subject to action by the state to
fulfill its trust responsibilities. Courts must take a "close look" at the
decisions of the legislature or of state agencies that manage water
resources to determine if they comply with the public trust doctrine and
will not merely rubber stamp agency or legislative actions.' The court
also stated that the "trust is a dynamic, rather than static, concept and
seems destined to expand with the development and recognition of new
public uses."57
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that a statute providing
that the waters of the state belong to the public, "expresses the Public
Trust Doctrine," permitting "alienation and allocation of such precious
state resources only after an analysis of present supply and future
need."' More recently, that court upheld a decision of the State Engineer
to allow a permit to drain wetlands because the State Engineer had
studied the evidence in detail and acted to protect the public interest. The
court noted that the public trust doctrine is not necessarily intended to
require no development, but to control development.'

49. Id. at 712, 728.
50. Id. at 712.
51. Id. at 728.
52. Id. at 719.
53. Id. at 728.
54. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447 n.2 (Idaho 1985).
55. Id., citing Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho
1983).
56. Id.
57. Id., quoting Roderick E. Walton, The PublicTrust Doctrinein the Water Rights Context:
The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 62 (1982).
58. N.D. CENT.CODE § 61-01-01 (1995).
59. United Plainsmen Assoc. v. N.D. State Water Cons. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457,46263 (N.D. 1976).
60. In re Stone Creek Channel Improvements, 424 NoW.2d 894, 902-03 (N.D. 1988).
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The Utah Supreme Court declared that the state manages water
as trustee for the benefit of the people:
Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a
scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is
indispensable to the welfare of all the people, and the State
must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use
of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State
as a whole.'
Although New Mexico courts have not explicitly recognized the
public trust doctrine, they have adopted elements of the doctrine. The
New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that this state has police
powers over water, and that "public waters of this state are owned by
the state as trustee for the people .. ."6 The state does not part with
ownership of water; it allows only a usufructuary right to water.6
Moreover, the state prescribes how water may be used.' Water rights
are subject to the principle that their use shall not be injurious to the
rights of others or of the general public,"
New Mexico courts also have held that the terms "public interest"
"public
welfare" are to be construed broadly.' These rulings
and
provide an indication that New Mexico courts are likely to view the
public trust doctrine expansively and may overturn decisions where the
State Engineer fails to give sufficient weight or consideration to public
welfare values.
As applied by a number of western states' courts, the public trust
doctrine is inclusive of public welfare and public interest considerations.
The public trust doctrine provides a basis for states' authority over and
responsibility for water resources; public welfare and public interest are
the broad terms for the values states seek to protect in exercising their

61. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State of Utah, 655 P.2d. 1133,1136 (Utah 1982). This holding is similar
to a Nebraska Supreme Court case, In re Hitchcock and Red Willow Irr. Dist., 410 N.W.2d
101, 108 (Neb. 1987). In Hitchcock, where an application was denied based on a finding that
there was insufficient water, the court upheld the denial and noted that as guardian of the
public welfare, the Department necessarily was given wide discretion. Id. at 108.
62. Fellows v. Shultz, 469 P.2d 141,143 (N.M. 1970); State ex rel. Reynolds v. W.S. Ranch
Co., 364 P.2d 1036, 1038 (N.M. 1%1).
63. State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 225 P.2d 1007, 1010 (N.M. 1950), citing Murphy v. Kerr,
296 F. 536, 540 (D.N.M. 1923).
64. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1981), citing
Holguin v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., 575 P.2d 88, 92 (N.M. 1977).
65. State v. McLean, 308 P.2d 983, 987 (N.M. 1957).
66. Id. at 989.
67. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P.2d 1045,1049-51 (N.M. 1910); City of El Paso
v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 698-702 (D.N.M. 1984).
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responsibility.' Thus, the public trust doctrine should inform any
decision regarding implementation of the public welfare criterion in the
New Mexico water code.
III. DEFINING "PUBLIC WELFARE": FOUR OPTIONS
Because public welfare was not defined in the water code, there
are a number of options available to the State Engineer for implementing
the public welfare criterion, including:
1) interpreting public welfare sufficiently narrowly that the issue
is essentially avoided;
2) doing nothing affirmatively to define public welfare and rule
on the issue in an ad hoc manner;
3) relying solely on the definitions that evolve from the regional
and state water planning process to produce definitions of public welfare;
or
4) promulgating regulations defining public welfare broadly and
establishing standards for applying the public welfare criterion.
A. Limiting the Definition of Public Welfare
A 1994 order issued in response to Intel's application for water
indicates that public welfare may be equated with beneficial use. ' Such
an approach would negate the legislature's requirement to consider detriment to the public welfare as an element distinct from beneficial use."

68. The public trust doctrine is a remedial device available when the system fails to
protect the public interest. "No after-the-fact remedy can deal precisely or effectively with
resource use and allocation, so the most valuable function of the doctrine is to signal the
need for processes to avoid its judicial application." COMMI EE OF WESTERN WATER
MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 102.

69. New Mexico State Engineer Finding and Order, Intel Corporation Applications, RG57125, RG-57125-S and RG-57125-S-2 (June 10, 1994) (on file with the author). There, the
State Engineer stated: "a statutorily recognized beneficial use of water is not against the
1
public welfare of the state." Id. at 14.
70. To equate public welfare with beneficial use is contrary to principles of statutory construction. The plain language should be the primary indication of legislative intent. V.P.
Clarence v. Colgate, 853 P.2d 722 (N.M. 1993). Courts will not construe statutes "so as to
impute the legislature with useless acts." Allen v. Amoco Production Co., 833 P.2d 1199,1201
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see also Dona Ana Say. & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Dofflemeyer, 855 P.2d 1054 (N.M. 1993); Matthews v. State, 825 P.2d 224,225 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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1. The Courts Require A Broad Definition
Water law in the West has never been static. Uses of water
considered to be beneficial have expanded from mining and other
economic values to include health, environment, conservation and
recreation.'
Over 85 years ago, the New Mexico legislature gave the
Territorial Engineer the authority to deny applications found to be
contrary to the public interest.' When the New Mexico Supreme Court
analyzed the public interest requirement three years later, it ruled that the
public interest is not limited to public health and safety, but should be
construed broadly in order to "secure the greatest possible benefit from
[public waters) for the public."' More recently, the U.S. District Court
for the district of New Mexico ruled that public welfare in New Mexico
"is a broad term including health and safety, recreational, aesthetic,
environmental and economic interests."' Two New Mexico district
courts have also upheld broad definitions of public welfare.' Thus, the
parameters of public welfare have been broadly, not narrowly, delineated. Given this precedent, it is unlikely that New Mexico courts will allow
the State Engineer to limit public welfare in the manner indicated in the
Intel decision.
Approval of beneficial uses without consideration of public
welfare may result in harm to or destruction of public welfare values.
The duty of the State Engineer should be to avoid or minimize harm to

71. See discussion, infra, Sec. IV. For a comprehensive discussion of the need to focus
on the public interest criterion and third party impacts, see COMMITrEE OF WESTERN WATER
MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNcIL, supra note 9. The committee's 'basic
conclusions are that allocation processes should afford third parties with water rights-and
those without them-legally cognizable interests in transfers and that states should develop
new ways to consider these interests." Id. at 4.
72. 1907 N.M. Laws, ch. 49, § 28.
73. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910).
74. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
75. See Application of Sleeper, No. RA 84-53(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct., April 16, 1985); Henry
Anaya, et al. v. Public Service Company, No. SF 43,347 (N.M. Dist. Ct., June 22, 1990). In
Sleeper, the district court gave a broad definition to the term public interest which appeared
in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-7 (Michie 1978), a statute that applied to applications for unappropriated water. The applicant in Sleeper was seeking a permit to transfer an existing water right.
The Court of Appeals overruled the district court, not because it had given a broad definition
to public interest, but because § 72-5-7 did not apply to transfers of water rights when the case
was decided. In re Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). The New Mexico legislature
amended the Water Code in 1985, and the public welfare criterion now applies to both permits
for use of unappropriated water and transfers of existing water rights.
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public welfare values. 76 For example, diversion of water for industrial
use is clearly a beneficial use, but if that use results in polluted water
supplies, beneficial use may not be equivalent to the public welfare.
Given the duties imposed by the public trust doctrine, it becomes even
more probable that equating public welfare with beneficial use as was
suggested in the Intel order would be rejected by the courts.'
2. Implications of a Limited Definitionfor InterstateTransfers
In 1983, New Mexico's statutory prohibition against out-of-state
transportation of ground water was declared unconstitutional. The court
applied the holding in Sporhase v. Nebraska" where the U.S. Supreme
Court found that a Nebraska statute prohibiting withdrawal and
transportation of Nebraska's water by another state unless that state had
a reciprocity clause placed an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.
The Sporhase court upheld, however, a state's right to base
decisions regarding exportation of water resources on conservation and
public welfare considerations. A state does not discriminate against
interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent "uncontrolled" transfers of
water out-of-state. A state has the right to protect the health and wellbeing of its citizens as long as that right does not rely primarily on
economic concerns. 9 The court emphasized, however, that state statutes
must "regulate evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest. " 0
In response to the El Paso ruling, the New Mexico legislature

amended a number of water statutes to give the State Engineer authority
to deny an application if it is contrary to conservation or detrimental to
the public welfare of the state. Significantly, these criteria apply to all
new appropriations and transfers, not just to interstate transactions.
If New Mexico equates beneficial use with public welfare, it loses
its ability to protect its citizens from having critical water resources

76. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 712, 728 (Cal. 1983). The
California Supreme Court held that water appropriated without consideration of the public
trust doctrine may cause harm to public trust interests. Id.
77. Moreover, the courts could require any agency to exercise discretion, in this case
to distinguish between public welfare and beneficial use. Cf. Pueblo of Cochiti v. United
States, 647 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.N.M. 1986). The court stated that "[aJcts tantamount to a
refusal to exercise discretion are subject to judicial review." Id. (citations omitted).
78. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex tel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The Supreme Court's
decision was based on the Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNST., ART. 1, § 10, which bars states
from placing burdens on interstate commerce.
79. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
80. Id. at 954, citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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allocated to other states. If New Mexico is to "regulate evenhandedly," it
must treat intrastate applications in the same manner as interstate
applications. Consequently, if we hope to retain our water in state to protect
our environment, traditional cultures and aquifer sustainability, we must
apply those same concerns to intrastate applications. A regulation that
clearly applies to all applications - interstate and intra-state - will
accomplish the objective of keeping water in New Mexico more effectively.
Actions that are informal or ad hoc are more easily viewed as discriminatory
and thus not permissible under the Sporhase rationale.'
B. Ad Hoc Rulings
Administrative agencies have an obligation to provide substantive
and procedural protections to safeguard parties whose rights are subject
to their authority. With no guidance, decisions are more likely to reach
inconsistent results, increasing the uncertainty for all parties subject to an
agency's actions. The lack of certainty in turn will result in more appeals
and increased costs to the parties and the state - to no one's benefit.
Because significant powers are delegated to administrative
agencies, a body of administrative law has developed to protect the public
from abuses of power by non-elected officials. One principle is that
delegation of authority is invalid unless limited by standards that guidethe
agency's discretionary power and enable the courts to decide whether the
agency followed such standards.' An Oregon appellate court held that
when the legislature delegates power in broad statutory language such as
"demanded by public interest or convenience," the administrative agency
has a responsibility to establish standards by which the law is to be
applied.s

81. Another reason for the State Engineer to avoid too narrow a construction of public
welfare is that the federal government may pass laws it determines are necessary when
states have failed to protect values such as preserving water quality or endangered species.
82. Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the
West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 693 (1987). Legislatures create the
framework for administrators; administrators must deal with specifics:

Typically a regulatory agency must decide many major questions that
could not have been anticipated at the time of the statutory enactment;
typically, legislators are unable to write meaningful standards that will be
helpful in answering such major questions; and typically, the protection
will be less in standards than in frameworks procedural safeguards plus
executive, legislative or judicial checks.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE CASE LAW 36-37 (5th ed. 1973).
83. Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 289, 292 (Or.
Ct. App. 1973). The court also stated:
Without written, published standards, the entire system of administrative
law loses its keystone. The ramifications affect every party and every

Fall 19961

IMPLEMENTING THE PUBUC WELFARE REQL/IREMENT

695

sBecause public welfare has not been defined in New Mexico by
statute or regulation, State Engineer decisions may be overturned, not
necessarily because they reach the wrong conclusion, but because the
decisionmaking process was insufficiently delineated. New Mexico courts
may go so far as to require adoption of standards or definition of public
welfare in their decisions, as has happened in a number of western
states."
Important public policies should not be developed in response to
individual cases on a piecemeal basis. If the definition of public welfare
evolves ad hoc, decisions that appear valid in one case may set poor
precedents for water use statewide and mislead applicants in subsequent
water transactions.

procedure involved in the fulfillment of the agency's responsibility under
law, e.g., the public, the applicant, agency personnel, the participants in the
hearing, the commission, the legislature and the judiciary.
The policies of an agency in a democratic society must be subject to public
scrutiny. Published standards are essential to inform the public. Further,
they help assure public confidence that the agency acts by rules and not
from whim or corrupt motivation...
An applicant... should be able to know the standards by which his
application will be judged before going to the expense in time, investment
and legal fees necessary to make application. Thereafter, he is entitled to
even treatment by rule of law and reasonable confidence that he has
received such treatment. This cannot be achieved without published rules.
Id. at 293; see also Steamboaters v. Winchester Water Cons. Dist., 688 P.2d. 92, 97 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984). In a later case, the court ruled that where there are "inexact terms" such as
"maximum economic development" or "wasteful, uneconomic ... it is the agency's task to
interpret ambiguous statutory terms in a way that effectuates the underlying statutory
policy." Diack v. City of Portland, 759 P.2d 1070, 1078 (Or. 1988) (citation omitted).
84. In Idaho, the Supreme Court mandated an expansive definition of Idaho's public
interest statute. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985). For a discussion of Shokal, see
note 145, infra and accompanying text. In California, courts have listed values comprising
public interest as well as mandating the Water Board to protect public trust values. Marks
v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983). In Utah, a court required the State Engineer to consider public welfare in transfer
applications even though that requirement did not appear in the statutes. Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). In Washington, a court required the Department of
Ecology to broaden its definition of public welfare to include environmental values. Stempel
v. Dep't of Water Resources, 508 P.2d 166, 171 (Wash. 1973). Even though neither public
interest nor public welfare appear in the Colorado statutes, the Colorado Supreme Court has
mandated the protection of the public interest in water. Wadsworth v. Kuiper, 562 P.2d 114,
116-17 (Colo. 1977); Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v. Tosc Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1304 (Colo. 1985).
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C. Utilizing the Regional and State PlanningProcess
Fortunately, New Mexico has begun the process of water planPublic policy considerations must be part of the regional water
planning process if regional water plans are to be effective. Since the
planning process is an important vehicle for determining the public welfare
in individual areas, the regional water plans should not be ignored. They
reflect important grassroots concerns. The regional planning process,
however, should be viewed as a complement to implementation of the
public welfare requirement, not as a substitute for it.' Reliance solely on
regional planning definitions of public welfare by the State Engineer Office
in cases before it has serious legal flaws.
ning.0s

1. Administrative Law Concerns
To rely on the Interstate Stream Commission's regional water
planning process to define public welfare shifts the rulemaking power to
regional planning groups and the Interstate Stream Commission, an action
not authorized by statute and, consequently, an unlawful delegation of
authority. The legislature gave only the State Engineer authority to adopt
regulations to enforce laws administered by his office.' As a general
principle, "[aidministrative bodies and officers cannot delegate power,
authority and functions which under the law may be exercised only by
them, which are quasi-judicial in character, or which requires the exercise
of judgment.""
In an analogous New Mexico case, the Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) requested the Environmental Improvement Division
(EID) to prepare draft regulations for the EIB to adopt. The court ruled that
the "EID had no duty or authority by law to prepare the regulations for EIB.
We can only assume that EIB impermissibly delegated its authority to the

85. In 1985, the New Mexico legislature enacted N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (Michie Repl.
Pamp. 1985), which provides that planning by municipalities, counties and public utilities
promotes the public welfare. In 1987, the legislature enacted N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-44
(Michie Repl. Pamp. 1993), which authorized the Interstate Stream Commission to make
grants or loans of funds for regional water planning.
86. "Such an approach [regional planning] could, in the end, expedite transfers by
building public confidence in the fairness of evaluation procedures and by reducing

uncertainty about what standards apply." COMMITrEE
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at

OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT,

181.

87. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-8 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1985).
88. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 637 P.2d 38,47 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1981) citing Anderson v. Grand River Dam Auth., 446 P.2d 814, 818 (Okla. 1968).
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Director of EID to perform its work in preparation of the public hearing.""
Thus, the courts would be unlikely to uphold definitions of public welfare
drafted by the Interstate Stream Commission or delegated to regions
developing regional plans.
Second, relying only on the regional and state plans to define
violates the procedural requirements in the statute giving
welfare
public
the State Engineer rulemaking authority 0 To adopt a rule, there must be
publication of a proposed rule along with findings of fact that demonstrate
that in the State Engineer's opinion, the rule is justified. The proposed rule
must be available for public inspection. The State Engineer must provide
for publication of the rule or a summary of it. All parties must be afforded
an opportunity to present evidence91; that opportunity cannot be limited
to special interest groups working within the regional planning process.
Administrative law also requires that rulemaking be based on a hearing
and an analysis of evidence 2 and that substantial evidence support the
agency's decision. "When governmental agencies adjudicate or make
binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals,
it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process."" Allowing the
definitions of public welfare to emerge from the planning process shortcircuits administrative law principles generally and the rulemaking
procedures required in the water code specifically."4
Third, leaving the definition of public welfare to regional planning
groups violates another basic premise of administrative rulemaking: Quasijudicial powers must not be left to those with any substantial self-interest
in the outcome." "In administrative law it is essential that an independent
state agency sit as a fair and impartial body at a hearing in which massive
and important regulations are to be adopted." Regional water planning
groups, composed in large part of major water users, do not meet this
criterion.

89. Kerr-McKee, 637 P.2d at 46.
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-8 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1985).

91. Id.
92. See Kerr-McGee,637 P.2d at 46; Reid v. N.M. Bd. of Examiners, 589 P.2d 198,199-200
(N.M. 1979).
93. Reid, 589 P.2d at 200 citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
94. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-8 (Michie Repl. Pamp; 1985).
95. See Sax, supra note 35; City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1959);
Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), affd on reh'g, 55 N.W.2d 40
(Wis. 1952).
96. Kerr-McGee, 637 P.2d at 46.
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2. Public Trust Doctrine Concerns
Although regional water plans have the potential to maximize
democratic input,7 the planning process generally involves those who
have the greatest economic stake in current water use and management in
the state. Regional planning groups in fact often have lacked breadth and
scope of participation." Indeed, the Interstate Stream Commission states
that regional planning committees reflect the major water use interests."
In some regions, planning has been limited to a few individuals, has
specifically excluded some interests, or has evolved without public
participation. Despite efforts to involve a cross-section of the public, nonmajor users and third parties impacted by water decisions may be
inadequately represented. Moreover, regional water plans will be limited
to regional priorities, potentially to the detriment of statewide needs.
Understandably, water users will be working to protect their own
interests first. Although users are essential to any planning process, there
is a clear conflict of interest in giving limited groups the responsibility for
developing public welfare criteria. Protection from unreasonable interference by special interests is clearly mandated by the judicial principles that
have evolved under the public trust doctrine. Those who are responsible for
protecting the public trust must act to protect broadly based public interests
and powerful minorities [who] often have undue
from "self" interested
0
influence.

Given these flaws in the regional water planning process, the State
Engineer may not abdicate his trust responsibilities by simply adopting a
checklist of public welfare values from the regional water plans. Moreover,
public resources are matters of statewide concern, and decisions regarding
the use and disposition may not be delegated to narrowly based groups or
interests. 1 1 The State Engineer has statewide responsibilities, and consideration of the public welfare must include statewide needs and concerns.

97. It should be noted that the Interstate Stream Commission requires that regional
water planning entities work to promote broad public participation in developing regional
water plans. See NEW MEXICO INTERSTATE STREAM COMM'N, REGIONAL WATER PLANNING
HANDBOOK (1994) (on file with the commission).
98. WEsTERN NETWORK, I REGIONAL WATER PLANNING DIALOGUE 1 (1993) (on file with

Western Network, Santa Fe, New Mexico).
99. Interstate Stream Comm'n Memorandum (July 17, 1992) (on file with the
commission).
100. Sax, supra note 35, at 560.

101. See City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 97 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1959); Muench v. Public
Service Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952), affd on reh'g, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952).
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D. Adoption of Regulations DefiningPublic Welfare
The pitfalls of narrowly defining public welfare, ruling on anadhoc
basis and relying on the regional water planning process discussed above
are avoided if the State Engineer adopts regulations defining public
welfare. Adoption of regulations will: 1)provide greater fairness, certainty
and procedural protections to all parties involved in applications; 2) avoid
unlawful delegation of authority; 3) ensure that public welfare is not
defined by special interests; 4) promote public trust doctrine principles; 5)
comply with administrative law requirements; and 6) ensure that all factors
necessary to protect water resources are considered."° Inaction inevitably
will shift the responsibility for defining public welfare to the judiciary.
The legislature has given the State Engineer explicit statutory
authority as follows:
The state engineer may adopt regulations and codes to implement and enforce any provision of any law administered by
him...in the accomplishment of his duties. In order to accomplish its purpose, this provision is to be liberally construed.r 3
Given that administrative bodies are created by statute,104 the
"authority granted to an administrative agency should be construed so as
to permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative intent or policy." '05
The legislature provided the State Engineer with broad powers to
implement and enforce the water laws." 6 Thus, there is legislative and
judicial authority for the State Engineer to adopt regulations that define
public welfare and provide criteria to be used in making public welfare
determinations when necessary. Use of this authority most clearly
promotes sound development of public policy." The rulemaking

102. This is consistent with the National Research Council's recommendation for states
to "develop and publish clear criteria and guidelines for evaluating water transfer proposals
and addressing potential third party effects." Commn-rE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 255.
103. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-2-8 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1985).
104. Public Serv. Co. v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 549 P.2d 638, 641 (N.M. Ct.App.
1976).
105. Id. at 642.
106. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 800 P.2d 1061, 1062 (N.M. 1990). The New Mexico
Supreme Court has specifically held that the police powers of the state extend to the State
Engineer Office. State ex rel. Reynolds v. W.S. Ranch Co., 364 P.2d 1036, 1038 (N.M. 1961);
see also Fellows v. Schultz, 469 P.2d 141, 143 (N.M. 1970).
107. In addition, the "more comprehensive and predictable the review process, the more
incentive water sellers and buyers will have to accommodate those [third party] interests
throughout the transfer process." COMMITTEE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 8.
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procedure lays a foundation for consideration of public welfare and
provides for an orderly, open process for defining public welfare.
1. Scope of Regulations
The State Engineer has been reluctant to interpret public welfare
broadly,"' There is, however, ample precedent for broad definitions of
legislatively mandated principles. Environmental regulations, for example,
have been recognized and upheld judicially despite their breadth:
In this field [of environmental regulation] it has long been
recognized that it is impossible to anticipate every factual
situation that might arise under a given set of regulations.
Further, it is important on the record before us to remember that
we are dealing with regulations, legislative justification for
which is found in broadly applied terms such as public interest,
social well-being, environmentaldegradation,and the like. That it is
within the power of the legislature to enact legislation for those
purposes is well settled. (Citations omitted.) In order to give
effect to these broad legislative concerns, however, it is necessary that the standards developed by the administrative agency
be somewhat general. Indeed, administrative regulations of this
kind are required to hold the difficult line between overbreadth
or vagueness on the one hand and inflexibility and unworkable
restriction on the other."e9 (Emphasis in original.)
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also held that to "be reasonably
adequate, the standards need not be specific.' Broad standards are
permissible so long as they are capable of reasonable application and are
108. See State EngineerTask Force, supra note 13, at 13-16. There is also concern that if an
examination of public welfare raises broad issues, costly experts become increasingly
necessary, and financial resources may determine who wins or loses. The State Engineer,
however, is statutorily required to consider public welfare, and the courts have held that
public welfare is to be construed broadly. The reality is that costs are increased regardless
of whether or not the term is defined. See COMMITTEE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT,
NATIONAL REsEARcH COUNcIL, supra note 9, at 251-52 (discussing transaction costs). For
effective implementation of the public welfare requirement, it is important that public
welfare concerns be evaluated before action is taken and financial resources committed.
Although it may be costly at the outset, it will be less costly to the parties and society if
foreseeable future impacts are acknowledged and incorporated into current decisions
regarding allocation of scarce water resources.
109. N.M. Mun. League, Inc. v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 539 P.2d 221, 229 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 540 P.2d 248 (N.M. 1975).
110. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that it is sometimes "impracticable and
unreasonable to require legislation setting out more precise standards [than those sought
by the plaintiffs]." Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 582,585
(N.M. 1975); see also Duke City Lumber Co. v. N.M. Envtl. Improvement Bd., 681 P.2d 717,
720 (N.M. 1984).
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sufficient to limit and define the agency's discretionary powers.""' Other
jurisdictions have held that where a statute contains an "inexact" term, the
task is to2 interpret ambiguous terms to effectuate the underlying statutory
policy."
There are also precedents for the application of broad social and
economic requirements beyond the scope of an administrative agency's
stated expertise. The Environment Improvement Act, for example,
mandates that the Environmental Improvement Board adopt regulations
governing a wide variety of concerns including food, radiation, occupational health and safety, and water quality, among others." 3 The
Environmental Improvement Board is required to "give the weight it deems
appropriate" to the evidence presented at public hearing and must consider
such factors as the "public interest," including "social, economic and
cultural values.""' 4 Yet members of the Board are not experts in these
111. State v. Pina, 561 P.2d 43,48 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) citing City of Santa Fe v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964).
112. Diack v. City of Portland, 759 P.2d 1070, 1078 (Or. 1988).
113. The Act states:
The board shall promulgate regulations and standards in the following
areas:
(1) food protection;
(2) water supply, including regulations establishing a reasonable system
of fees for the provision of services by the agency to public water
supply systems;
(3) liquid waste;
(4) air quality...;
(5) radiation control ...;

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

noise control;
nuisance abatement;
vector control;
occupational health and safety...;
sanitation of public swimming pools and public baths;
plumbing, drainage, ventilation and sanitation of public buildings in
the interest of public health;
(12) medical radiation, health and safety certification and standards for
radiologic technologists...;
(13) hazardous wastes and underground storage tanks...;
(14) solid waste...
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-1-8 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1993) (references to statutes omitted).
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-1-9 (Michie Repl. Pamp. 1993). The Act states that "in making
its regulations, the board shall give the weight it deems appropriate to all relevant facts and
circumstances presented at the public hearing, including but not limited to:
(1) character and degree of injury to or interference with health, welfare,
animal and plant life, property and the environment;
(2) the public interest, including the social, economic and cultural value
of the regulated activity and the social, economic and cultural effects
of environmental degradation; and
(3) technical practicability, necessity for and economic reasonableness of
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areas; members are appointed by the governor, and the only requirement
is that a majority represent the "public interest."' 5
Utilizing a broad definition of public welfare is bolstered by the
Park City Principles " ' which call for problems to be "approached in a
reducing, eliminating or otherwise taking action with respect to
environmental degradation.
J. Upon appeal, the court of appeals shall set aside the regulation only if
found to be:
(1) arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion;
(2) not supported by substantial evidence in the transcript; or
(3) otherwise not in accordance with law.
Id.
115. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-1-4 (Michie Repl. Pamp, 1993).
116. The struggle to manage water in an era of increased scarcity and changing demands
is not limited to New Mexico. All arid, western states face these problems. In response to
these challenges, the Western Governors' Association and the Western States Water Council
sponsored three workshops in Park City, Utah in 1991 and 1992. Despite the diversity of
interests in each workshop, the experts and policy-makers involved agreed upon a number
of principles referred to as the Park City Principles. The Park City Principles were adopted
by the Western Governors Association in 1992. Western Governors' Association, Water
Management and the Park City Paradigm,Resolution 92-007 (June 23, 1992) (on file with the
Western Governors' Association).
The first workshop developed six principles. The following three principles are
those that apply to consideration of implementing the public welfare criterion in New
Mexico's water code:
1. There should be meaningful legal and administrative recognition of
diverse interests in water resource values.
2. Problems should be approached in a holistic or systematic way that
recognizes cross-cutting issues, cross-border impacts and concerns,
and the multiple needs within the broader 'problemshed'-the area that
encompasses the problem and all the affected interests. The capacity
to exercise governmental authority at problemshed, especially basin
wide, levels must be provided to enable and facilitate direct interactions and accommodate interests among affected parties.
3. The policy framework should be responsive to economic, social and
environmental considerations. Policies must be flexible and yet
provide some level of predictability. In addition, they must be able to
adapt to changing conditions, needs, and values; accommodate
complexity; and allow managers to act in the face of uncertainty.
See BELL, supra note 12 (discussing each principle and the Park City Principles generally).
The second workshop focused on how public interest should be incorporated into
water management in the West. The group's mission statement recognized that western
water officials are
increasingly challenged to integrate into their actions a diverse set of
evolving and changing values and interests ....
The quality of waterrelated decisions and acceptance and respect for water institutions and
policies depends in part on how well officials respond to these challenges.
.... [Dlecisions, policies, and actions are most likely to be 'in the public
interest' when they are reached in a manner that provides an opportunity
for full participation, and a full range of values and interests to be
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holistic or systematic way that recognizes cross-cutting issues, cross-border
impacts and concerns, and the multiple needs within the broader
'problemshed'-the area that encompasses the problem and all the affected
interests." A report on the Park City Principles notes that the Idaho's public
interest protection "is consistent with the Park City call for recognition of
the full range of values associated with water."117 The National Research
Council also concludes that states should develop definitions and criteria
for assessing what constitutes the public interest, perhaps benefiting from
the legislative and judicial experiences of the states of Idaho and Alaska.
Such definitions should embrace existing water rights holders, environmental water needs for ecosystem protection, and social and cultural values in,
basins of origin 1

2. Weighing Public Welfare Concerns

The legislature provided no guidance on whether some water uses
are more likely to promote public welfare than other uses or on how the
State Engineer was to apply the public welfare criterion."' It is improbable and probably undesirable that the legislature by statute or the State
Engineer by regulation could devise a formula or rank uses in a way that
would truly protect the public welfare or anticipate the outcome of cases
before the State Engineer Office. What is important to the public welfare in
one location or time may be detrimental in another place and time. For
example, agriculture may provide the economic base in one area and

considered. Although it is rarely possible to fully satisfy every interest,
decision-makers must strive to consider and weigh interests in a fully
accessible balancing process that produces information about those
interests.
Western Governor's Association, supra note 1, at 3.
The group recommended that states "must have policies which require consideration of all elements of the public interest .... To ensure credibility of the process, decisionmakers must strive to consider and weigh interests in a fully accessible balancing process."
Id. at 4.
117. BELL, supra note 12.
118. COMMITTEE OF WEsrERN WATER MANAGBENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 9, at 11. The Council also noted that the "more comprehensive and predictable the
review process, the more incentive water sellers and buyers will have to accommodate those
[third party) interests throughout the transfer process." Id. at 8.
119. Indeed, no western state specifically prioritizes public welfare values. Generally,
decisions are left to the discretion of the administrative agency.
The Committee on Western Water Management notes that the "underlying challenge
of any process used to evaluate transfers is how to determine and balance equitably the
relative benefits and costs." COMmITTEE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 5. The Committee, however, does not see this challenge
as a bar to the process of weighing public welfare concerns. Id.
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moving agricultural rights to another use would be detrimental to the
public welfare of that area. In another region, the land-may have been
sufficiently depleted that agriculture is no longer a viable economic activity,
and recreational opportunities may provide the most benefit to the
community. Decisions based on public welfare considerations rest on factspecific situations. Therefore, the only realistic option to protect public
welfare values is to give the State Engineer broad discretion to weigh the
evidence based on criteria established by regulation and make a decision
that best promotes the public welfare in each case before him. 2 '
Such an approach is not new. Nearly 30 years ago, the primary
author of Alaska's public interest legislation wrote:
The decisions will be difficult. No law can make them, no
formula, no computer. They must be made by people. The
balancing of benefits against cost must be performed by the
exercise of judgment. All the law can do is direct the water
administrators to consider all factors, to give each its proper
weight, and to reach an informed judgment that will tend to put
the state's resources to the maximum use consistent with
121 the
public interest, for the maximum benefit of all its people.
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court developed a list of public
interest values to be considered, but noted that not all the values would
appear in any one case. Nor are the values to be given equal weight in
every case. Public interest values will vary with local needs, circumstances
and interests.' " The court also gave discretion to the administering
agency to determine which public interest values are impacted and what
is required to protect the public interest."z

120. The Park City participants felt that "[diecision-makers must strive to consider and
weigh interests in a fully accessible balancing process. The scope of participation should be
consistent with the scope of the problem and should include interests broader than just
those who have water rights. Government should be relied upon to represent any known

non-present interests."
ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY

WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL & WESTERN GOVERNORS'
OF 'THE PARK CITY PRINCIPLES" FROM THE 1991 PARK CITY, UTAH,
WORKSHOPS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT IN AN
ERA OF CHANGING VALUES 3 (1991) (draft on file with the Western States Water Council and

the Western Governors' Association).
121. Frank J. Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 27-28
(1967) (discussing the Alaska public welfare statute which Mr. Trelease was hired to draft
and which lists factors Alaska's commissioner must consider in determining the public
interest).
122. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 450 (Idaho 1985); see also Benz v. Water Res.
Comm'n., 764 P.2d 594, 597-98 (Ct. App. Or. 1988). In Benz, the Oregon Court of Appeals
ruled that even if a proposed use is beneficial, the Commission or the Director may balance
the "proposed use against other beneficial uses, conflicting interests and concerns" and can
place conditions on a permit to reflect those concerns.
123. Shokal, 707 PO.d at 450.
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IV. SUMMARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE AND PUBLIC INTEREST
REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER WESTERN STATES12 4
Public welfare and public interest are not new concepts in western
water law. With few exceptions, arid, western states have looked to public
welfare or public interest statutes to protect their water resources. Given the
breadth of the public welfare concerns, it is only surprising that there is
some similarity between the methods states have used.
Consistent with the public trust principles that evolved from early
colonial law, public control of water is protected in the West. Many western
states explicitly recognize public ownership of water. Arizona was the first
state to enact legislation which recognized public ownership of water, and
Colorado's constitution was the first to declare that water was the property
of the people and was dedicated to the use of the people of the state.1"
Nine of eighteen western states have either constitutional or statutory
provisions asserting public ownership of water resources."
Public welfare or public interest requirements were adopted in
many western states in the late 1800s and early 1900's," beginning with
Wyoming in 1890." By 1990, all western states except Colorado and
Oklahoma had enacted public welfare or public interest requirements; even
in Colorado, however, the Colorado Supreme Court held that protection of
public interest is required."
In recent years, public concern about the health, environmental,
conservation and cultural considerations of water allocation and manage124. A summary of the constitutional, statutory and judicial public interest and public
welfare requirements from other western states as well as comments by state agencies on
how well those requirements are implemented is available from the New Mexico
Environmental Law Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
125. Frank J.Trelease, Government Ownership andTrusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638,
641 (1957).
126. Those states with public ownership provisions in their constitutions include: Alaska,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, Wyoming.
Those without such provisions include: Arizona, California, Kansas, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas and Utah. California's Constitution does state, however, that
"the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use
... in the interest of the people and for the public welfare." CAL. CONST. art. 10 § 2.
127. Douglas L Grant, supra note 83, at 683-84. This article has a good summary of the
development of public welfare/interest statutes in water codes in the West.
128. Shannon A. Parden, The Milagro Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land and
Water Assoc. v. Sleeper: Public Welfare Defies Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J.
861, 871 (1989), citing Grant, supra note 83, at 685.
129. In 1977, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Constitution infers "a
vital interest in preserving the water resources of the state land] mandates the protection
of the public interest in water." In re Wadsworth, 562 P.2d 1114, 1116-17(Colo. 1977). That
principle was reaffirmed in 1985 in Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1304
(Colo. 1985).
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ment has resulted in broadening the scope of public welfare considerations,
both legislatively and judicially. These changes in public values have
caused public welfare definitions to move increasingly beyond economic
and consumptive uses to non-consumptive uses.
A. Public Welfare/Public Interest Values
Fourteen of 18 western states have adopted public welfare/interest
lists of uses. Six of the 14 states list uses explicitly in their public welfare/interest statutes' 3 and in six other states, the lists appear in the
beneficial use sections."3 ' In two states, lists of public welfare and public
interest values were developed by the courts.32
Examples of uses of water that are deemed to be in the public
welfare/interest include:
*
*
*
*
*
*
•

groundwater recharge (Arizona");
preservation of public trust lands and water to serve
ecological units for scientific study, open space, fish and
wildlife habitat and scenic resources (California");
instream flow (Colorado'5);
aquatic life, aesthetic beauty, water quality, assuring minimum stream flows, discouraging waste and encouraging
conservation (Idaho"s);
health and safety, recreational, aesthetic, environmental
and economic interests (New Mexico) 37
state water plan, flood control (Oregon '); and
natural resources, public health (Washington9) .

B. Public Welfare/PublicInterest Impacts
Six states include lists of impacts. Alaska was the first state to
define public welfare in this manner in 1966, followed by North Dakota and
Oregon in 1985.

130. The six states are California, Montana, Nebraska, Texas, Oregon and Wyoming.
131. These six states are Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, North Dakota, Utah and
Washington.
132. The two states are New Mexico and Idaho.
133. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-401 (1994).
134. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).

135. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-102 (West 1990).
136. IDAHO STAT. § 42-1501.
137. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).

138. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1988).
139. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§

90.54.010-.910 (West 1992).
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The Alaska statute 4"° requires the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources to consider the following in determining the
public interest:
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed
appropriation;
(2) the effect of the economic activity resulting from the
proposed appropriation;
(3) the effect on fish and game resources and on public
recreational opportunities;
(4) the effect on public health;
(5) the effect of loss of alternative uses of water that might be
made within a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed appropriation;
(6) harm to other persons resulting from the proposed appropriation;
(7) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the
appropriation; and
(8) the effect upon access to navigable or public water.'41
The North Dakota public interest statute is similar to Alaska's but
does not specifically include the "effect on public health" and "access to
navigable or public waters" provisions." Oregon considers seven factors
including "conserving the highest use of water," maximum economic
development, prevention of wasteful, uneconomic, impracticable or
unreasonable use of water, and state resource planning.' In 1985, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the public interest requirement be
interpreted expansively and looked to a number of sources in crafting a
definition of public welfare, including the Alaska definition of public
welfare.'" Nebraska and Wyoming have less developed lists of

140. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
141. When an application is received that raises one of the issues enumerated in the
statute, the Department contacts the affected agency, such as the Game and Fish
Department, and requests the agency's comments on the application. The Department also
attempts to provide adequate public notice on applications. Usually when public interest
considerations are raised, the application is approved with conditions that relate to the
public interest concern. So far, the only complaints have come from parties who feel that
there has been inadequate public notice. Telephone conversation with Kellie Litzen, Water
Resources Officer, Department of Natural Resources (May 25, 1994).
142. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06 (Repl. Pamp. 1995).
143. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5) (1988).
144. See Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 447-50 (Idaho 1985). The court found that there
is an "affirmative duty [on the Director] to assess and protect the public interest." Id. at 448
(emphasis in original). The court recognized the Board's authority to limit or impose
conditions in the public interest and stated: "If the board determines a particular use is not
in furtherance of the greatest public benefit on balance the public interest must prevail." Id.,
citing People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859,866 (Cal. 1980). In addition, the court relied on Utah
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The "laundry list" approach of defining public welfare has been
criticized for not limiting the scope of inquiry or giving weight to relative
merit of competing public welfare values. An inclusive list of factors to be
considered, however, will at least ensure that important public welfare
values are considered and not ignored.'"
New Mexico is not the first state to wrestle with defining a broad
term in statute or regulation, and the experiences of other states indicate
that there are workable solutions. Interviews with agency officials from
other states have not revealed any significant problems resulting from
having defined public welfare. 7 Even though the definitions are broad,
and California authority to enable the Director to approve applications subject to future
appropriation for "uses of greater importance-in effect prioritizing among uses according
to the public interest." Id., citing Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957,962-64 (Utah 1943); East Bay
Municipal Utility District v. Department of Public Works, 35 P.2d. 1027,1027-30 (Cal. 1934).
Having determined there was a duty to protect the public interest, the court turned
to the "more difficult task' of defining public welfare and cited a New Mexico case for the
proposition that the public interest should be read broadly to "secure the greatest possible
benefit for the public." It noted that the definition of public welfare may differ in different
parts of the state where there are other needs. Id. at 448-450, citing Young & Norton v.
Hinderlider, 110 P.2d 1045, 1050 (N.M. 1910). The court also discussed protection against
"the loss of water supply to preserve the minimum stream flows required for the protection
of fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and
navigation values, and water quality." Id. at 448-49, citing Idaho's Minimum Stream Flow
Statute, IDAHO CODE § 42-1501. The court also addressed the need to discourage waste and
encourage conservation. Id. at 449, citing People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d. 859, 866 (Cal. 1980).
Finally, the court discussed property values, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation,
aesthetic beauty and water quality. Id., citing Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983).
145. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-2,116 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1995).
146. In Alaska, where public interest considerations are broadly defined, the Chief of
Water, Department of Natural Resources, said that he feels the Alaska statute works
precisely because it is general rather than specific and gives the Department broad
discretion. Telephone interview with Gary Prokosch, Chief of Water, Alaska Department of
Natural Resources (June 17, 1994).
147. The following summarize discussions with public officials in states where broad
definitions of public welfare or public interest have been implemented:
Alaska: When an application is received that raises one of the issues
enumerated in the statute, the Department contacts the affected agency,
such as the Game and Fish Department, and requests the agency's
comments on the application. Usually when public interest considerations
are raised, the application is approved with conditions that relate to the
public interest concern. So far, the only complaints have come from parties
who feel that there has been inadequate public notice. Telephone interview
with Kellie Litzen, Water Resources Officer, Alaska Department of Natural
Resources (May 25, 1994).
The Chief of the Water Section says that he feels the Alaska statutes
work fairly well because the public interest criteria are broad and general
rather than specific, and broad discretion is given to the Department. In
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addition, implementation of the public interest criteria has not been
problematic in part because there are few areas in the state with water
deficits and in part because there are few applications for transfers of
water. Telephone conversation with Gary Prokosch, Chief of Water, Alaska
Department of Natural Resources (June 17, 1994).
Idaho: A lawyer for the Department states that the Department has
in fact appreciated the addition of public interest considerations to
applications for appropriations and transfers. Prior to the adoption of the
public interest language, the Department was concerned that in some cases
there were issues that needed to be addressed, but there was insufficient
legal authority to include them in the decision-making process. The
attorney also reported that there have been no problems with using the
public interest parameters set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court provided
each decision is supported by sufficient evidence in the record and
decision. Telephone interview with Phil Rassier, Senior Legal Counsel,
Idaho Department of Water Resources (July 7, 1993).
An Attorney General said public interest is now automatically an
issue in all cases. Public interest is decided on a case-by-case basis in the
same manner common law cases are considered by the courts. With time,
factual patterns develop that provide guidance and instill confidence. He
also recommended that in order to gain public acceptance, the use of
public interest criteria should be not used to undo past decisions, but
should be limited to current and future impacts only. For example, if water
has already been diverted and an applicant seeks to change the use,
impacts on instream flow should not be considered. Telephone interview
with Kleve Strong, Idaho Attorney General's Office (Aug. 30, 1994).
Nebraska: The advantage to using these criteria is that "everyone
walks away from the hearings feeling they have exhausted every argument." The Assistant Director is personally comfortable with these criteria,
although some people find them too broad. Telephone interview with Don
Blankinau, Assistant Director and Legal Counsel, Nebraska Water
Resources Department (Aug. 30, 1993).
North Dakota: The Director of the Water Appropriations Division said
that he feels North Dakota's public interest statute is working, and there
have not been many questions raised regarding public interest considerations. In cases where public interest was taken into account, there have
been two requests for rehearing and no appeals to the courts. He feels that
people are "not dissatisfied with the factors to be considered." Telephone
interview with Milt Lingbig, Director of Water Appropriations, North
Dakota State Water Commission (Aug. 18, 1993).
Oregon: The staff who perform technical reviews of pending
applications use a "public interest checklist," i.e., the standards for public
interest review, that lists the public interest factors involved, including
cultural and historic interests and riparian and ecological factors. Telephone interview with Jake Szramek, Permit Reviewer, Oregon Water
Resources Commission (Aug. 19, 1993).
Texas: In order to incorporate public interest criteria into its regulatory program, the Natural Resource Conservation Commission: 1) defines
and applies the public interest criteria through submission of a social,
economic and environmental impact statement; 2) places conditions on the
application to protect the public interest; and 3) "seeks to minimize public

70(
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they should be an improvement over no definition or incremental
definitions derived from individual agency and court decisions.
V. DRAFT OF A PUBLIC WELFARE REGULATION" RELATING
TO PUBLIC WELFARE AND CONSERVATION
The State of New Mexico recognizes the importance of public welfare and conservation of surface and groundwater in administering its
public waters. The legislature affords standing for those asserting
legitimate concerns involving public welfare and conservation of water in
avoids unduly burdening the administrative and judicial
a manner which
149
processes.
A. Public welfare includes, but is not limited to, the following
considerations:
(1) health and safety;
(2) economic consequences, including impacts on the
existing economy and area of origin" of water
rights, maintenance of traditional rural and agricultural economies, recreation, and external costs;
(3) encouragement of conservation and discouragement
of waste or impractical or unreasonable uses of
water;
(4) environmental and ecological consequences, including impacts on fish, wildlife and plants, ecologically
critical areas, riparian ecosystems, wetlands, and
watershed management;m''

interest conflicts by creating economic incentives to conserve water and
transfer it to higher valued uses." OFRcE OF WATER MANAGEMENT, A
REGULATORY GUiDANcE DOCUMENT FOR AppLcAnONS TO DIVERT, STORE OR
USE STATE WATER 23 (Mar. 28, 1994) (draft on file with the Texas Natural

Resource Conservation Commission, Office of Water Resource Management). The burden to assess potential public interest impacts is on the
applicant.
Id. The impact statements are modeled on the federal National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. § 4331) requirements, but the information required in the statements has been
modified to reflect the factors needed to process a permit application. Telephone interview
with Bruce Moulton, Environmental Scientist and Policy Specialist, Water Policy Division,
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (Aug. 30, 1994).
148. The following draft public welfare regulation is generally a composite from statutes,
court decisions and regulations from western states.
149. This language already appears in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-5.1 (Michie Repl. Pamp.
1985).
150. See COMMITTEE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,

supra note 9, at 257-59 (discussing area of origin protection).
151. COMMbrTEE OFWESERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 9, at 251 (discussing instream flow).
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(5) sustainability, sustained yield, groundwater recharge, and aquifer management;
(6) water quality;'"
(7) loss of alternative uses of water that might be made
within a reasonable time if not precluded or hindered by the proposed application;
(8) opportunities for reuse of return flows;
(9) protection and enhancement of historic, cultural and
natural resources, and aesthetic values;
(10) preservation of public and trust lands, water and
open space;
(11) scientific study;
(12) whether high-quality water is being used when
locally available low-quality water would suffice;
and
(13) public welfare as defined in the regional and state
plans or by elected officials in land use planning.
The State Engineer shall request comments on a proposed
application from applicable state, federal or tribal governmental agencies if the application appears to affect any
public welfare consideration under the authority of that
agency.
The State Engineer may request that the applicant submit
a social, economic and environmental analysis if he is
concerned that the application may be detrimental to the
public welfare or contrary to conservation of water.
Upon presentation of evidence by the protestant that the
application is detrimental to the public welfare or contrary
to conservation of water, the applicant for an appropriation has the burden of proof to show that the proposed
application will not negatively impact the public welfare
and conservation.
The State Engineer shall consider and balance the relative
benefits and detriments of the considerations listed in
Subsection A of this regulation, along with any other
considerations deemed appropriate, in determining
whether the application is detrimental to the public
welfare or contrary to conservation.
In determining whether an application is detrimental to
the public welfare and contrary to conservation of water,
the State Engineer shall consider and prepare findings
which include the following factors:
(1) the benefit to the applicant resulting from the proposed appropriation;

152. See CoMMrFEE Op WEsTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,

supra note 9, at 265-66.
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(2) the benefit or harm to other persons resulting from
the proposed appropriation;
(3) the degree to which the proposed application affects
public welfare as defined in subsection A of this
section;
(4) whether the application includes a conservation
plan;
(5) whether there arebetter, alternative sources of water;
(6) the degree to which the action may establish a
precedent for future actions with significant effects,
represents a decision in principle about a future
consideration, or is an irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of water resources;
(7) whether the application under consideration is
related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts on the
public welfare and conservation of water;
(8) the short and long-term consequences of the proposed application; and
(9) the intent and ability of the applicant to complete the
appropriation.
If the State Engineer determines an application is not
detrimental to the public welfare and contrary to conservation pursuant to this rule, the application may be
approved subject to the provisions of New Mexico statutes. In the interests of public welfare and conservation,
the State Engineer may impose reasonable conditions to
mitigate or minimize threatened damage to the public, and
to promote the public welfare and the efficient use and
conservation of water. The State Engineer may also limit
the term of the permit if the application requests water for
a project that is limited in time and need or for other
reasons.
Beneficiaries or proponents of an appropriation or transfer
may be required to bear any mitigation costs as a matter of
equity.'
VI. CONCLUSION

The public welfare requirement in New Mexico's water code
represents an opportunity as well as a challenge. Because public welfare is
a broad term encompassing diverse values, the challenge is to ensure that

153. This appears at the recommendation of the Committee on Western Water
Management. COMMrrIE OF WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 9, at 257.
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the requirement is applied fairly. This challenge must be met if New
Mexico is to protect its water resources. With increasing stresses on our
water supplies, the importance of making wise decisions about our water
management that look to the future as well as the present multiplies. The
public welfare requirement provides an opportunity to ensure judicious,
thoughtful use of our water.
Western water officials and managers - state, tribal, local, and
federal - are increasingly challenged to integrate into their actions a
diverse set of evolving and changing values and interests and to consider
the views of those who speak for these interests. The quality of waterrelated decisions and acceptance and respect for water institutions and
policies depends in part on how well officials respond to these challeng1
es. 5

154. Western Governors' Association, supra note 1, at 3.

